On 3 July 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’ or ‘Court’) delivered (non–official English version here) its Advisory Opinion on a request submitted by Chile and Colombia on the obligations of States to respond to the climate emergency under international human rights law. The Court framed climate change as a human rights crisis within the Inter-American legal framework. The Court affirmed that all OAS Member States, not only those party to the American Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention’) and the Protocol of San Salvador (‘Protocol’), are bound by international obligations stemming from the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (‘Declaration’) and the OAS Charter.
Climate Change is a Climate Emergency for All
The Court framed the current situation constitutes a climate emergency, embedded within what it termed the ‘triple planetary crisis’ that poses ‘an existential threat to humanity and the planet’, consisting of three overlapping and mutually reinforcing phenomena: (a) climate change, (b) pollution, and (c) biodiversity loss (see paras 1, 10 and 84). It recognised the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous human right (paras 62, 99), whose violation can occur independently of direct harm to individuals. This reconfiguration reinforces the legal status of non-human entities such as forests, rivers, and ecosystems as rights-bearers, rather than mere resources for human use. In doing so, the Court reinforces an ecocentric or biocentric (as opposed to anthropocentric) and intergenerational approach, noting that ‘the rights of future generations must be protected now through climate action’ (paras 103–105).
The Court further declared that States’ climate obligations possess an erga omnes character, meaning they are owed to the international community as a whole. Climate change, it held, entails transboundary impacts on human rights, thus necessitating extraterritorial obligations and duties of prevention (paras 157–161). This reinforces the principle that environmental protection is a matter of global public interest, and that insufficient climate action by one State can constitute a breach of duties owed universally.
State Binding Obligations for a Liveable Planet
The IACtHR affirmed that States have binding obligations under international human rights law to prevent, mitigate, and redress the adverse impacts of climate change. These obligations derive not only from the Convention and the Protocol, but also from the Declaration, the OAS Charter, customary international law, general principles, and erga omnes duties. The Court held that States must take urgent, coordinated, and ambitious action to prevent and mitigate climate change due to its direct impact on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights such as the rights to life, health, food, and water (paras 128 and 139). These obligations are grounded not only in treaty law but also in broader sources of international law, including custom and general principles (paras 157–158, 176).
A key component of States’ international legal obligation is the duty of prevention, which requires them to ‘adopt measures’, such as undertaking environmental impact assessments, emission reduction targets, and restrictions on fossil fuel subsidies, to prevent significant environmental damage that could infringe on the human rights of people within and beyond their territory (para 166). This encompasses not only the duty to avoid direct harm but also the obligation to regulate third parties (read: private companies) whose activities contribute to emissions and environmental degradation.
The Court affirms that the climate crisis poses transboundary harms and implicates rights that extend beyond individual States, thereby creating duties not just towards their own populations but toward the international community. By framing the duty to prevent environmental harm as an erga omnes obligation, the Court underscores that States are legally bound to act even when the victims of environmental degradation reside outside their borders. This shift reflects the recognition that climate change endangers global public goods, like the atmosphere and biosphere, the protection of which is fundamental to the shared interests of all humanity (para 157).
Importantly, the Court highlights the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, affirming that while all States must act, those with greater historical responsibility and capacity bear heightened obligations (para 152, para 236). The Convention does not formally classify some States as developed. Nevertheless, the Court drew on broader principles of equity and differentiated capacities in international environmental law, particularly those articulated in the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, to recognise that States with greater economic and technological resources, and those historically responsible for the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions, have intensified duties of mitigation and support. The Court also stresses the legal duty of international cooperation (para 205–209), requiring wealthier and more capable States to finance, share technology, and support adaptation efforts, especially for vulnerable States and communities.
Further, the Court situates these obligations within broader international legal norms, drawing on the jus cogens status of the prohibition against irreversible environmental damage (para 106), and referencing legal developments under the UN system and international environmental treaties (such as the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement); and regional agreements (such as the Escazú Agreement). Together, these frameworks establish a unified, rights-centred, and precautionary legal approach to addressing the climate emergency. The Court clarifies that failure to fulfil these obligations may constitute a breach of binding international human rights law, not merely a policy lapse, and thus carries legal consequences under the Inter-American system (para 176, 210).
Climate Change via Human Rights-Based Approach: Comments
The IACtHR’s Opinion marks a jurisprudential milestone by formally integrating climate change within the framework of binding human rights obligations. By recognising the transboundary and structural nature of the climate crisis, the Court establishes that States have legal duties, not merely aspirational goals, to prevent and mitigate climate-related harm under principles of international human rights and environmental law. The Opinion’s foundational contribution lies in framing climate obligations as erga omnes, that is, obligations owed to the international community as a whole. It underscores that the duty to prevent environmental degradation affecting human rights is not limited by territorial boundaries but arises from the universal interest in preserving the planet and human dignity. This framing finds further strength in the Court’s affirmation of the jus cogens character of the prohibition on causing irreversible climate harm, elevating environmental protection to a peremptory norm of international law.
A second important dimension of the Opinion is its recognition of Nature as a subject of rights, building upon developments in domestic and international law that confer legal personhood to ecosystems. By affirming Nature’s legal status, the Court advances an ecocentric approach within human rights jurisprudence, thereby expanding normative protections beyond anthropocentric limitations. Furthermore, the Court’s treatment of climate-induced human mobility is equally significant. By recognising that climate change can compel displacement and thereby trigger obligations under the rights to life, dignity, non-refoulement, and freedom of movement, the Court extends protection to those affected by environmental disasters in a manner that aligns with evolving international norms.
Nonetheless, the Opinion is not without its analytical limitations. While the Court’s interpretive expansion is normatively appealing and legally innovative, its practical enforceability remains uncertain. The Court articulates ambitious standards, such as extraterritorial liability for transboundary harm (para 158–165), obligations of prevention and precaution (para 166–167), and the need for robust participation and transparency (para 237–242), but offers limited guidance on mechanisms to monitor compliance or ensure redress in cases of violation. Given the structural asymmetries in political power, economic resources, and institutional capacity across States parties to the Convention, translating these standards into enforceable domestic measures may prove difficult, especially in countries with fragile environmental governance systems or limited access to climate finance. Similarly, although the Court acknowledges the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls, the treatment of gender remains largely declaratory. The Court stops short of articulating clear, enforceable obligations or institutional reforms needed to address structural gender and sexual orientation disparities in climate governance. This absence of specificity undermines the transformative potential of the Opinion in addressing intersectional harms.
Furthermore, while the Court affirms that States have binding obligations in the context of the climate crisis, it is important to clarify the nature and scope of these duties. The obligations articulated in the Opinion are not framed as stand-alone climate obligations under environmental treaties like the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement. Rather, they are human rights obligations that apply in respect of climate action, deriving their normative force from the Convention and the Protocol. These include duties to protect life, health, housing, food, and a healthy environment from climate-related harms. While some of these intersect with core climate functions, such as mitigation (eg emission reductions), adaptation (eg disaster risk strategies), and support (eg international cooperation and technology sharing), others are more procedural or regulatory, including obligations to provide climate information, regulate private actors, ensure access to justice, and include affected communities in decision-making. As such, the Advisory Opinion does not impose new international climate obligations per se, but rather clarifies that failure to act on climate change may constitute a breach of pre-existing human rights obligations. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this framework will hinge on whether national courts, legislatures, and regional institutions translate advisory norms into binding regulatory and judicial mechanisms.
In sum, the IACtHR has opened the door to a rights-based paradigm for environmental protection. It affirms the indivisibility of human rights and climate action and provides a compelling normative foundation for future litigation and policymaking. Its success, however, depends on strategic mobilisation by civil society, political will, and institutional capacity to transform normative ambition into enforceable reality.
Sarthak Gupta serves as a Judicial Law Clerk-cum-Research Associate at the Supreme Court of India. He holds a BA/LLB (Hons) degree from Nirma University, India. His research interests span Comparative Constitutional Law and Public International Law, with a particular focus on Anti-Discrimination Law, Digital Constitutionalism, Freedom of Expression, Feminist and Queer Legal Theories, and Reproductive Justice